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Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in 
the context of debates over new realisms in Continental philosophy. To answer it, the paper high-
lights five important points. First, Hartmann’s own distinction between the phenomenological school 
of thought and phenomenological method must be preserved. He does not accept the sweeping hu-
manistic opposition between the sciences and phenomenology, and yet (like the phenomenologists) 
he employs a method that aims to provide a description of phenomena following on a suspension of 
metaphysical commitments that is directed at their essential structures, with some important qualifi-
cations. Secondly, he rejects the phenomenological reduction because it identifies the natural attitude 
with a metaphysical standpoint and it advocates instead a ‘naïve consciousness’ free of metaphysical 
assumptions. Thirdly, his assessment of phenomenology is conditioned by his conception of cognition 
as a transcendent act. He finds that phenomenology fails to adequately account for the whole phenom-
enon of cognition, especially its characteristic grasp of something independent of the act. Fourthly, 
Hartmann grants the irreducibility of phenomena, but holds that they are characteristically unstable, 
referring to something beyond themselves and forcing us to decide whether what they show is genuine 
or not. There is thus no infallible intuition of phenomena. Finally, from an epistemological perspective, 
the concept being-in-itself is merely a counterpart to the concept of the phenomenon, which we do not 
need for the purposes of ontology. Based on this reassessment, it is concluded that Hartmann employs 
some form of the phenomenological method but cannot be identified as a phenomenologist.
Key words: Nicolai Hartmann, phenomenology, being-in-itself, cognition, phenomenological method, 
transcendent act, phenomenal transcendence, natural attitude, natural realism, metaphysics.
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Был ли Гартман феноменологом? Ответ на этот вопрос стал еще более важным в  контексте 
дебатов о новом реализме в континентальной философии. Для ответа на него в статье выде-
ляется пять важных пунктов. Во-первых, нужно удерживать различие между феноменологи-
ческой школой мысли и феноменологическим методом, проводимое самим Гартманом. Он не 
принимает беспочвенное гуманитарное противопоставление наук и  феноменологии. Вместе 
с тем он (как и феноменологи) использует метод, имеющий своею целью вслед за приостанов-
кой метафизических утверждений осуществить дескрипцию феноменов, которая направлена 
на их сущностную структуру, с некоторыми важными модификациями. Во-вторых, он отвер-
гает феноменологическую редукцию, так как она отождествляет естественную установку с ме-
тафизической позицией, тем самым оправдывая ее в  качестве «наивного сознания», свобод-
ного от метафизических допущений. В-третьих, его отношение к феноменологии обусловлено 
его концепцией познания как трансцендентного акта. Он считает, что адекватное объяснение 
феномена познания в его полноте феноменологии не удается. В особенности это касается по-
стижения чего-либо независимо от акта. В-четвертых, Гартман допускает нередуцируемость 
феноменов, но приходит при этом к выводу, что обычно они являются нестабильными, вы-
нуждая нас принимать решение о том, является ли то, что они являют, подлинным или нет. 
Поэтому нет безошибочного созерцания феноменов. Наконец, глядя из  эпистемологической 
перспективы, понятие бытия-в-себе — это всего лишь двойник понятия феномена, который 
является излишним для целей онтологии. Основываясь на такой новой оценке, сделан вывод, 
что Гартман использует определенную форму феноменологического метода, но не может быть 
опознан в качестве феноменолога.
Ключевые слова: Николай Гартман, феноменология, бытие-в-себе, познание, феноменологиче-
ский метод, трансцендентный акт, феноменальная трансценденция, естественная установка, 
естественный реализм, метафизика.
1. INTRODUCTION
Phenomenology was always a partner in dialogue for Hartmann in his attempts 
to develop a critical ontology in the first half of the twentieth century. However, there 
has been quite a bit of unclarity surrounding the answer to the question “Was Nico-
lai Hartmann a phenomenologist?” For instance, early in his career there was serious 
disagreement about whether Hartmann should be considered part of the phenomeno-
logical movement or not. Christian Möckel points to the Berlin philosophical faculty 
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debate over whether to ‘call’ Hartmann, Heidegger, or Cassirer to Berlin in 1929, in 
which they were clearly under the impression that Hartmann appeared to be simply 
a follower of Husserl and Scheler with nothing original to say (Möckel, 2012, 110). In 
contrast, Husserl himself, in a letter to Cassirer a few years earlier, complained that in his 
groundbreaking Basic Principles of the Metaphysics of Cognition Hartmann “completely 
misunderstands phenomenology” and offers nothing but a “backwards dogmatic meta-
physics” (Husserl, as cited in Möckel, 2012, 112). In his retrospective discussion of Hart-
mann’s relation to the phenomenological movement, Herbert Spiegelberg equivocally 
concludes that “Hartmann’s philosophy contains enough phenomenological ingredients 
to claim for him the status of an independent and highly unorthodox ally” (Spiegelberg, 
1960, 387). This is hardly a definitive ruling on the question.
In short, confusion rather than clarity reigns on this question. But why bother 
with it in the first place? Has not the history of philosophy relegated Hartmann to 
the dustbin, while his contemporary Heidegger went on to become the guiding star 
of Continental thought? Although the question whether or not Hartmann was a phe-
nomenologist may seem trivial, the philosophical stakes in it are in fact quite high 
in light of current developments in Continental thought. Hartmann himself noted 
that we see in the past only what our current horizon of problems allows us to see 
(Hartmann, 2017). Current debates surrounding so-called speculative realism, new 
realism, correlationism, and phenomenology allow us to see that Hartmann, as one 
of the few philosophical realists of his day, had to struggle to escape the clutches of 
correlationism in the form of phenomenological idealism and Neo-Kantianism. This 
puts us in a position to learn something from Hartmann about how to resist forms 
of anti-realism, and this is what makes the question “was Hartmann a phenomenol-
ogist?” in fact highly relevant. In terms of content, what is at stake in the question is 
whether the Kantian distinction between the ‘for us’ and the ‘in itself ’ is a legitimate 
one. Hartmann makes some surprising claims about the concept of the phenomenon 
and of ‘being-in-itself ’ which make situating his position relative to phenomenology 
complicated but instructive. This paper is by no means an exhaustive or definitive dis-
cussion of Hartmann’s relation to phenomenology, but offers a few insights that point 
in the direction of a more constructive answer to the question. 
The first step forward is to insist on a distinction that Hartmann himself makes 
when he writes about phenomenology. Phenomenology can be considered both a 
‘school of thought’ and a method for philosophy. He claims that phenomenology as 
a method is not only useful, it is a necessary component of a threefold methodology 
for philosophy that includes phenomenological description, aporetics, and theory, in 
that order. As a school of thought, however, phenomenology has inspired a bracing 
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turn to ‘the things themselves,’ but has also often brought along its own metaphysical 
claims that it cannot substantiate by its own means. As Spiegelberg noted, Hartmann 
himself never claimed to be part of phenomenological movement or school, but he 
does claim to utilize its method. Therefore, the discussion here is largely limited to 
what Hartmann understands by the method in light of a reconstructed definition. 
Beforehand, the broader issue of motivation for the phenomenological school should 
be briefly mentioned. Situating the phenomenological movement culturally allows us 
to resist the temptation to treat its method as insulated from the broader cultural cur-
rents in which it is embedded, and of which Hartmann and his contemporaries were a 
part. Following this the paper falls into roughly two halves that tackle these questions: 
Which aspects of phenomenological method does Hartmann adopt and which does 
he reject? How does Hartmann’s handling of phenomenology shape the way he dis-
cusses the distinction between the ‘for us’ and ‘in itself ’? What does Hartmann mean 
by ‘being-in-itself,’ and is it necessary for anti-realist ontology?
2. PHENOMENOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
In addition to assessing their philosophical merits, Hartmann interprets posi-
tivism, Neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology as reactions to a cultural crisis allegedly 
driven by a specific understanding of what the natural sciences are and do. In a recent 
book by Tom Sparrow, he also notes that phenomenology develops as a response to 
a crisis driven by the corrupting force of reductionist naturalism in the sciences. As 
Sparrow sums it up, for phenomenology broadly “[n]aturalism attempts to subject 
every domain of existence to the rigor of mathematical science, and ideally limit the 
sayable to the language of mathematics” (Sparrow, 2014, 7). The Cartesian mathesis 
universalis is the threat here, and phenomenology would be “the antidote, then, to 
the kind of naturalism that ‘alienates’ the immortal human spirit by reducing it to 
third-person natural knowledge” (Sparrow, 2014, 7). According to him, phenomenol-
ogy is “basically an ideological reply to the worldview of technoscientific rationality 
and culture” (Sparrow, 2014, 9). Hartmann, similarly, saw positivism and Neo-Kan-
tianism to be furthering the project of universal quantification and reduction, and 
since phenomenology regarded this as the core of science itself, it was perceived as a 
threat to its implicit humanism.
The critique of science [in phenomenology] takes off from the form of science emptied 
of content and reduced to a formalistic level. The critique sees through it, but mistakenly 
takes this to be the essence of science itself. In this way, it allows itself to be deceived by 
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a narrow momentary trend in the history of science. It can no longer see beyond its tow-
ering conceptual apparatus, does not see the relational contexts with their abundance of 
givenness, with the intuitively concrete; it only sees abstraction and construction. It regards 
science to be estranged from life, estranged from intuition… (Hartmann, 1965, 214–215)
Hartmann argues that because this definition of science is mistaken, however, 
the diagnosis of the cause of the cultural crisis is also wrong, and the hyperbolic reac-
tion to it in the form of anti-realist phenomenology is thus unnecessary. This is not to 
say that there is no cultural crisis—it is just that he thinks it is wrong to believe that 
‘science’ is its main cause. Thus, deflating an exaggerated conception of the scientific 
worldview is the first step toward more soberly assessing what phenomenology has to 
offer to philosophy. 
In other words, recourse to an anti-realist ‘human experience of the world’ can 
only seem like a solution if every form of realism or naturalism is reductionist in the al-
leged way. This is the presupposition on which the overreaction is based. The staged op-
position is between ‘phenomenology’ and ‘metaphysics,’ where metaphysics is a stand-in 
for reductionist naturalism. The ‘natural attitude’ of everyday life and the sciences is 
identified with this metaphysical standpoint, because in the natural attitude we assume 
(as do the sciences) the unproblematic existence of the objects of perception and cog-
nition. On this construal, a ‘metaphysical’ conception of the world entails an uncritical 
commitment to the reality of objects. As Sparrow puts it, phenomenology “is a prohi-
bition against metaphysics” (Sparrow, 2014, 15). “Phenomenology […] is exclusively 
committed to investigating only those dimensions of human experience that take shape 
within the correlation between thought and being. […T]he method of phenomenology 
[…] eschews metaphysical speculation” (Sparrow, 2014, 2). From Hartmann’s perspec-
tive, this polemical contrast conflates two distinct things. On the one hand, there is the 
phenomenon of what he calls ‘natural realism,’ which is not a metaphysical standpoint or 
theory and is simply our baseline way of existing in the world; on the other, the ‘meta-
physical standpoint’ of reductionist naturalism, espoused by that handful of theoretical-
ly oriented scientists and philosophers who happen to talk more loudly than all the oth-
ers. This is the second important point that will allow us to assess Hartmann’s relation to 
phenomenology. The solution for phenomenology, in light of this opposition, is to sus-
pend the natural attitude of everyday experience and of science, leading to a conception 
of a ‘naïve consciousness’ free of metaphysical assumptions. (I’ll explain Hartmann’s ob-
jections to such a thing below.) Hartmann believes that if we can distinguish between a 
natural realism of everyday life and the theoretical realism of metaphysical standpoints 
we can adopt a critical stance ‘this side’ of metaphysical idealism and realism. Hartmann 
thought that one of virtues of phenomenological method was precisely that it could be 
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conducted entirely ‘this side’ of that opposition. ‘Metaphysics’ is understood in a much 
broader way by Hartmann, and in his view the supposed ‘end of metaphysics’ allegedly 
ushered in by Kantianism and championed by everyone from positivists, Neo-Kantians, 
and phenomenologists to deconstructionists and post-moderns, has been greatly ex-
aggerated. To think that you are beyond the reach of metaphysical assumptions and 
problems is precisely the worst stance to take in philosophy.
These initial moves are a powerful way of deflating phenomenological preten-
sions. The crisis to which phenomenology is a response is not the crisis phenome-
nology thinks it is; it assumes that all realisms are the same; it conflates the natural 
attitude with the metaphysics of science. Hartmann’s own response to positivism and 
reductionism is complex, and ultimately involves his articulation of a stratified ontol-
ogy. For now, what matters is that Hartmann avoids going to either polemical extreme 
and finds the humanist motivation behind phenomenology and other forms of an-
ti-realism to be laudable but unjustified. The question now is what does phenomenol-
ogy as a method have to offer him.
3. COGNITION AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD
Phenomenology as method has to be distinguished from the characterization of 
phenomenology as a response to a humanist cultural crisis. Defining phenomenolog-
ical method is actually not that easy. Some definitions cast the net too wide, making it 
difficult to determine what makes phenomenological method unique (Sparrow, 2014, 
5–6). Others are too narrow. First of all, whether broad or narrow, all definitions of 
phenomenological method entail some claim about the method being ‘descriptive.’ It 
describes phenomena. What is entailed by this, as we see through its linkage to its sec-
ond key feature, is that the description takes place free of metaphysical assumptions 
that might prejudice or bias the description. Hartmann himself agrees that phenom-
enological description must be ‘this side’ of what he calls metaphysical ‘standpoints.’ 
Sparrow isolates two essential features of the method that would likely be agreeable 
to most claiming to employ it. According to Sparrow, phenomenologists ensure that 
these descriptions are standpoint-free by performing the first indispensable step of 
the method: the phenomenological reduction or epoché. The ‘absolute minimum con-
dition of phenomenology’ as a method is 
a suspension of the natural attitude and its attendant realism; without a strict commit-
ment to phenomena as they appear to consciousness as the sole arbiter of truth; and with-
out refraining from committing to anything that does not give itself phenomenally to 
consciousness, phenomenology cannot maintain its methodological integrity. Either 
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phenomenology is a method whose basic principle includes a suspension of metaphysical 
commitments — precisely because the metaphysical status of phenomena is not revealed 
by the phenomena themselves, but is at best hinted at by their resistance or apparent tran-
scendence of human consciousness — or it is simply a name applied to a style of doing 
philosophy that has no coherent method for establishing the legitimacy of its results. 
(Sparrow, 2014, 15, my emph.)
As already mentioned, Hartmann refuses to conjoin the ‘natural attitude’ and 
systematic ‘metaphysical commitments’ because he already finds an intellectualist 
prejudice here, as well as the identification of ‘realism in general’ with scientific re-
ductionist materialism. An epoché of the natural attitude is thus not required (or even 
possible), although a critical stance ‘this side’ of ‘standpoints’ does have to be a key fea-
ture of the method. Three other aspects of this passage point to issues that Hartmann 
himself tackles in Laying the Foundations, and they bear directly on the question of 
the difference between the ‘in itself ’ and the ‘for us.’ Two of these are the phenome-
non of the object’s “apparent transcendence of human consciousness” and the fact that 
“the metaphysical status of phenomena is not revealed by the phenomena themselves.” I 
discuss these in the next section. I discuss Hartmann’s opinion on evidentiality, or the 
epistemic authority of intuition, below.
The second key feature of phenomenology according to Sparrow follows on the 
reduction. It is its attention to the ‘transcendental.’ 
[F]or a philosophical description, study, or conclusion to count as phenomenological — 
that is, to mark it as something other than everyday description, empirical study, or 
speculative metaphysics — that description must take place from within some form of 
methodological reduction that shifts the focus of description to the transcendental, or at 
least quasi-transcendental, level. (Sparrow, 2014, 14) 
He continues to argue that “[w]ithout at least some attention to the transcendental 
[…] it becomes nearly impossible to see the philosophical value or understand the in-
stitutional influence of phenomenological description” (Sparrow, 2014, 15). Hartmann 
would accept this, I believe, provided we redefine the ‘transcendental.’ The idealist phe-
nomenological conception of what is transcendental follows the Kantian ‘dogmatic prej-
udice’ that the conditions of experience must reside in the subject itself. But this is just 
one interpretation of Kant’s ‘supreme principle.’ Readers will recall Kant’s principle: “the 
conditions of the possibility of experience in general must at the same time be the con-
ditions of the possibility of the objects of experience” (A 158/B 197) (Kant, 1998, 283). 
In an early essay on Kant, Hartmann argued that this principle expresses a ‘restrict-
ed identity thesis.’ These conditions of experience are neither completely identical nor 
completely different. The supreme principle itself is entirely ‘this side’ of the distinction 
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between idealism and realism, as Hartmann reads it, and can be interpreted in the di-
rection of placing the conditions of experience inside the subject (Kant’s solution) or 
both within and beyond the subject in the world. Hartmann claims that Kant’s idealistic 
answer to the question, which makes these conditions internal to the cognizing subject, 
results from his own ‘dogmatic prejudice.’ He believes a solution that remains faithful to 
the phenomenon of cognition can be proposed that places the conditions of experience 
not within the subject but within the wider reality of which both subject and object are 
parts. The partial identity between subject and object which conditions the possibility 
of (a priori) cognition results from the fact that both subject and object are determined 
by some shared ontological principles structurally superior to both. These principles are 
what Hartmann calls categories. Thus, Hartmann does not use the term ‘transcenden-
tals’ to refer to ontological categories or principles because they are not lodged in the 
minds of experiencers, but permeate the world of which they are a part. 
These three features fairly define phenomenological method as Hartmann him-
self seems to have understood it. Phenomenology aims to provide a description of 
phenomena following on a suspension of metaphysical commitments that is directed 
at their essential structures. (We could add: by means of infallible essential intuition. 
This point would be rejected by someone like Heidegger.) This definition of phenom-
enology now has to be seen through the lens of Hartmann’s own conception of cog-
nition. This conception is the third ingredient to our response to the question about 
Hartmann and phenomenology. 
As noted above, Hartmann simply does not accept the stigmatization of the 
‘natural attitude.’ Hartmann would agree with Husserl that everyday life and science 
are oriented by the ‘natural attitude’ to the world, or what he calls the intentio recta, 
but he rejects the devaluation of it that phenomenology implies, as well as the claim 
that this attitude amounts to a metaphysical position. The natural attitude, or the at-
titude of ‘natural realism,’ is not a theory or standpoint complete with metaphysical 
commitments. It is a phenomenon in its own right. 
Natural realism is not a philosophical theory. It belongs to the phenomenon of cognition 
and […] is identical with the captivating life-long conviction that the sum total of things, 
persons, occurrences, and relations, in short, the world in which we live and which we 
make into our object by means of cognizing it, is not first created by our cognizing it, but 
exists independently of us. (Hartmann, 1965, 49)
For Hartmann, the intentio recta that characterizes this orientation is to be con-
trasted with the reflective attitude of epistemology, logic, psychology, and phenome-
nology. This distinction is fundamental to his approach:
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The natural attitude toward the object — the intentio recta as it were, the being-oriented 
toward that which the subject encounters, what comes to the fore or offers itself, in short, 
the orientation toward the world in which it lives and part of which it is — this basic at-
titude is familiar in our everyday lives, and remains so for our whole life long. By means 
of it we get our bearings in the world, by virtue of it we are cognitively adapted to the 
demands of everyday life. However, this is the attitude that is nullified in epistemology, 
logic, and psychology, and is bent back in a direction oblique to it — an intentio obliqua. 
This is the attitude of reflection. A philosophy that makes one of these disciplines into a 
basic science — as many have recently done, and as all nineteenth century philosophical 
theories did — will be driven of its own accord into such a reflective attitude and will 
have no way to escape from it. This means that it cannot find its way back to the natural 
relationship to the world; it results in a criticism, logicism, methodologism, or psycholo-
gism estranged from the world. (Hartmann, 1965, 46)
Failure to make this distinction in philosophy risks committing basic errors that 
stem from the reflective attitude. For example, the ‘correlativist prejudice’ is an error 
stemming from the reflective attitude that consists in conceiving everything that exists 
as an ‘object’ for a ‘subject,’ thus misinterpreting cognitive limitations as ontological 
structures (Hartmann, 1965, 77–79). Another mistake lies in the phenomenological 
conception of ‘naïve consciousness’ that is imagined as the alternative to any meta-
physical stance (including the natural attitude). “In terms of its inspiration, the return 
to such a consciousness of the world should be positively valued” (Hartmann, 1965, 
215). However, as far as Hartmann is concerned, there is no such thing. 
We believe that naïve consciousness is the authoritative standard of all givenness. We do 
not notice that we are not familiar with such a thing, however. […] Naïve consciousness 
does not philosophize, and so does not reflect on itself, but philosophizing conscious-
ness is not naïve. Thus, neither encompasses naïve consciousness; the former does not 
because it does not ask, the latter does not because it stands worlds apart from it and 
does not know it. Thus, we reconstruct naïve consciousness, and take the reconstruction 
to be the description of something immediately given. The description turns out to be 
necessarily false. (Hartmann, 1965, 216)
Therefore, while Hartmann can agree that phenomenological description 
should be free of dogmatic metaphysical standpoints, the natural realist orientation 
to the world is not one of them. As a consequence, he has no use for the ‘phenome-
nological’ reduction1. The approach to phenomena should certainly exclude artificial 
1 Hartmann instead understands the reduction in terms of the ‘eidetic reduction,’ in which he sees 
philosophical value because it facilitates the description of (ideal) essential structures. Spiegelberg 
misconstrues Hartmann’s understanding of ‘reduction’ when he claims that Hartmann identifies 
“essential intuition with the phenomenological reduction, the latter being interpreted as the omis-
sion of the accidental from the essential” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 377). Husserl himself used ‘reduction’ 
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theories, but to believe that we are capable of getting rid of all of our own assumptions 
in order to become a ‘naïve consciousness’ is itself naïve. It becomes a kind of “willful-
ly uninformed philosophizing” (Hartmann, 1965, 216).
Another important feature of Hartmann’s conception of cognition is that he 
regards it as a ‘transcendent act.’ “Transcendent acts are those which establish a rela-
tion between a subject and an entity that itself does not first arise through that act, or, 
they are acts that make something transobjective into an object” (Hartmann, 1965, 
146). Cognition is one transcendent act among others, and is in fact embedded in a 
far-reaching network of affective acts in the life context. Cognition is a ‘grasping’ that 
is primarily receptive, where the subject is affected by something that is; there is also 
a spontaneity in the cognitive act, but this only consists in the creation of an image, 
concept, or representation of ‘what is’ (Hartmann, 1965, 148–149). This interpreta-
tion of cognition was directly opposed to Neo-Kantian conceptions that regarded the 
subject as the spontaneous source of all order and regularity in ‘nature.’ As Hartmann 
claims in the first line of the Metaphysics of Cognition, cognition is not a ‘creation or 
production’ of its objects, but a ‘grasp’ of something independent of it. When phe-
nomenological conceptions of cognition fail to take the ‘phenomenon’ of transcen-
dence built into the natural attitude seriously, they are also inadequate2. Insofar as 
they embrace the ‘principle of consciousness’ (consciousness only knows directly its 
own products or correlates) and remain philosophies of ‘immanence to conscious-
ness,’ they misinterpret the phenomenon of cognition. They only focus on half of the 
phenomenon. The Husserlian ‘law of intentionality’ is contrasted with Hartmann’s 
‘law of transobjectivity,’ which together describe the two sides of the phenomenon of 
cognition. The relation of intentionality exists between the act and the intentional ob-
ject, where consciousness ‘has’ the ‘object’ or ‘phenomenon’ (but not necessarily what 
is ‘in itself ’ beyond them); the relation of ‘grasping’ exists between the act and the 
being-in-itself that ‘is’ implicitly beyond the act. This distinction between the ‘object’ 
or ‘phenomenon’ and ‘being-in-itself,’ the ‘for us’ and the ‘in itself,’ is itself a product 
of the reflective stance of epistemology (and does not exist for the natural attitude). 
From this reflective perspective, it seems as if a great deal of significance should be 
in multiple senses in the Brittanica article of 1929 (Husserl, 1960, 120–121). Hartmann clearly has 
the eidetic reduction in mind when he writes that the method is “depicted by Husserl in his Ideas: 
as ‘putting into parenthesis,’ disregarding the given individual case, reduction, ‘bringing in front of 
the brackets,’ etc.” (Hartmann, 1965, 52).
2 In words that Hartmann himself might very well have used, Sparrow claims that phenomenology 
reduces “the reality of being, by rendering being dependent on human consciousness. It empties 
being of real transcendence” (Hartmann, 2014, 17).
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attributed to ‘being-in-itself.’ One of Hartmann’s greatest achievements has been to 
show that it is not something about which we need to make much of a fuss. I’ll explain 
why in the next two sections.
A final theme emerges from his definition of cognition. There is no such thing 
as infallible cognition. Hartmann does not think that intuition has the indisputable 
epistemic authority that most phenomenological authors take it to have. Almost as if 
in direct response to Husserl’s ‘principle of principles’ (“direct intuition is the origin 
of knowledge and to be respected as its own authority,” (Sparrow, 2014, 15; Husserl, 
1982, § 24)), Hartmann says that 
[t]here is a widespread view that in cognition of the ideal [i.e., essential structures] there 
is no possibility of deception. […] Again and again we think that we are dealing only 
with an inner, intentional object, and deception, error, and misconstrual are not even 
possible regarding it. (Hartmann, 1965, 273) 
Intuition too is a kind of cognition, and so it is also a transcendent act that 
originally aims at something transobjective. “Intuition is only cognition when it does 
not produce something, but ‘grasps’ something” (Hartmann, 1965, 273). As such, it 
can also be wrong about what it intuits, but its shortcomings in isolated cases can be 
rectified when placed in a wider context. Intuition
can incorporate individual components of cognition into the context of the whole, by 
which the sources of error in single intuitions are rectified. This takes place automatically 
everywhere scientific methods are underway. Science is interconnection, incorporation, 
comprehensive vision. An at least relative criterion of evidence results from the synthesis 
of stigmatic and conspective intuition — comparable to the criterion of cognition of the 
real in the synthesis of a priori and a posteriori elements. In both, it is not an absolute cri-
terion; but such a thing is not available to humankind in any case. (Hartmann, 1965, 273) 
Despite its lack of a criterion of evidentiality, Hartmann still praises phenome-
nology for providing a new kind of access to ideal essential structures. But he rejects 
the assumption that these structures only belong to consciousness or to a transcen-
dental subjectivity. They have ideal being, that is, they exist in their own atemporal, 
nonspatial, nonindividual way. Hartmann is closer to the realist Munich circle phe-
nomenologists in his understanding of ideal being here. ‘Conspective’ intuition also 
implies cognitive progress in duration at least for the individual, if not for the collec-
tive as well.
In a concluding statement on the topic of phenomenology, Hartmann says that 
“where phenomenology is a preparatory method, it performs outstanding and indis-
pensable service.” However,
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[w]here it encompasses the whole of philosophy as such, it relinquishes scientific culture 
and a larger comprehensive view of things, instead making a new appeal to healthy hu-
man understanding — as if the latter did not first have to learn to use its “understand-
ing” — becoming a kind of willfully uninformed philosophizing. The consequence is 
an uncritical faith in evidence and allegedly infallible certainty, the sacrifice of criteria 
worked out through centuries-long struggle, the general destruction of philosophical 
achievements, and the disappearance of the problem of cognition that becomes palpable 
in these achievements. (Hartmann, 1965, 216)
These points should explain the sense in which phenomenology is a viable 
method for Hartmann, as well as its limitations. They can be supplemented by further 
analysis of Hartmann’s definition of the ‘phenomenon’ itself, as well as of his peculiar 
concept of ‘phenomenal transcendence.’ This latter addresses the question of the dis-
tinction between the ‘for us’ and the ‘in itself.’
4. PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENAL TRANCENDECE
To Hartmann, cognition is a ‘transcendent act’ that reaches beyond itself to 
something ‘transobjective’ existing independently of thought. This aspect of the phe-
nomenon of cognition is often neglected in positions that adopt the reflective attitude 
from the start. The concepts ‘object,’ ‘representation,’ and ‘phenomenon’ necessarily 
entail a relation to the subject. Hartmann argues that it is impossible to use the term 
‘phenomenon’ as a substitute for ‘what is’ because it implies the existence of a subject 
to whom it appears, i.e., it is a product of the reflective attitude. Phenomena, however, 
also seem to implicitly refer beyond themselves to something transphenomenal, just 
as objects refer to something transobjective. This ‘phenomenal transcendence’ is not 
eliminated through the cognitive fiat of excluding the ‘in itself.’ There is a dialectic of 
dependence and independence relative to the subject that has to be reconciled in our 
conception of the phenomenon. There is something both irreducible and unstable 
about phenomena as such. This is the fourth constituent orienting our response to the 
question about Hartmann and phenomenology.
A phenomenological definition of the phenomenon seems to imply “that a 
‘self-showing’ (φαίνεσθαι) belongs to everything that is. The phenomena are then 
those which ‘show themselves’.” (Hartmann, 1965, 72–73). There are two mistakes in 
this conception according to Hartmann. First, ‘that which is’ is just as indifferent to 
‘showing itself ’ as it is to being ‘objectified.’ Both are subject relative determinations. 
There may be something that is that does not show itself, and there is no reason to 
claim that it exists less because of this. Secondly, ‘phenomenon’ does not entail that 
something real shows itself, since “[t]here are also illusory phenomena, empty sem-
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blances, which are not the appearance of anything.” Phenomena should be considered 
similar to ‘intentional objects’ for which “it is also not clear whether something corre-
sponds to them or not.” We certainly cannot avoid phenomena since 
[p]henomena are what is given and as such retain their irreducible significance. Given-
ness is always the first factor in philosophical investigation, but only the first. It is not the 
final factor, not the one which decides about what is true and untrue. […] We have to 
show the ‘phenomenon’ to its appropriate place. It is irreplaceable there. Beyond that it 
leads us into error. (Hartmann, 1965, 79)
Object, representation, and phenomenon are epistemological concepts that im-
ply the correlation between the subject and a cognitive counterpart that is necessarily 
dependent on the subject. From this perspective, there appears to be a distinction 
between what is dependent on a subject, i.e., objectified by it, and what is independent 
of it, i.e., the transobjective, transphenomenal, or being-in-itself. This is ostensibly 
what the cognitive act as a transcendent act aims at. Phenomenology (as Hartmann 
understands it) rules out the existence of anything beyond the correlation, but Hart-
mann thinks that this is a failure to describe the phenomenon of cognition adequately. 
If we push on the conception of the phenomenon itself we find that it overflows its 
own limits. 
As ‘what is given,’ phenomena are indispensable for all investigation, and de-
scribing them should be free of metaphysical assumptions. Hartmann even claims 
that “theories struggle against phenomena in vain.” There are ‘primary phenomena’ 
(Grundphänomene), such as the phenomenon of cognition, that simply cannot be ex-
plained away. But phenomena themselves are equivocal. In Laying the Founbdations, 
Hartmann presents what he calls ‘The Antinomy of Phenomenal Transcendence’3. 
The problem with phenomena is that although it is “the essence of a ‘phenomenon’ to 
have a verifiable factual character,” the “factuality of that which constitutes its content 
is not verifiable in it.” As Sparrow put it in the passage above, “the metaphysical status 
of phenomena is not revealed by the phenomena themselves” in their “apparent tran-
scendence of human consciousness.” Hartmann explains that “the phenomenon of the 
daily movement of the Sun in the sky from east to west is given and always verifiable, 
but whether the sun really executes such a movement in the cosmos is not verifiable 
3 The whole discussion of ‘phenomenal transcendence’ may be a response to Husserl’s discussion of 
“immanent transcendence” in Ideas, § § 44–46 (Husserl, 1982). Husserl places the emphasis on the 
immanence of experience, perception, and being, and Hartmann sees in this no real reference to the 
transcendent at all. Such an account keeps us from seeing that the “phenomenon of cognition” itself 
has metaphysical, i.e., transcendent, aspects that can be phenomenologically described (Möckel, 
2012, 120).
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with reference only to the phenomenon” (Hartmann, 1965, 152). Put in a general 
formulation, this means that “a phenomenon A does not as such signify the being of 
A. It could be that the being of B (i.e., something completely different) is behind it.” 
In the example, “instead of a movement of the Sun, a movement of the Earth could 
be behind the phenomenon. […] In phenomenon A, it is never evident whether A 
also exists in itself, that is, whether the phenomenon itself is the appearance of A or 
illusion” (Hartmann, 1965, 153). This already entails that we have moved beyond the 
notion of infallible intuition.
This conundrum is then reflexively applied to the case of cognition itself. We 
can verify that in the phenomenon of cognition there is an appearance of being-in-it-
self, it seems to point beyond itself to something in itself. Does this phenomenon 
of transcendent cognition prove the existence of an in itself implied by the act? No, 
and we seem to be faced with a genuine ‘antinomy’ here, or a kind of contradiction. 
In other words, the very content of the ‘phenomenon of cognition’ is to grasp some-
thing in itself, and so “[i]ts content contradicts the essence of being a ‘phenomenon’” 
(Hartmann, 1965, 152). In other words, “the phenomenon of cognition is of a sort that 
overshoots its own phenomenal character. This overshoot constitutes its ‘phenome-
nal transcendence’” (Hartmann, 1965, 152)4. We might think that “the phenomenon 
of being-in-itself of course indicates that being-in-itself actually exists,” and that it 
might be ‘verifiable’ in the phenomenon of being-in-itself. But this cannot be the case. 
“The phenomenon remains phenomenon, even if it is precisely a phenomenon of be-
ing-in-itself.” This is because “[i]t belongs to the nature of the phenomenon in general 
that it ‘transcends’ itself, allows its content to appear as something transphenomenal. 
But if all phenomena fundamentally point beyond themselves, then the phenome-
non of being-in-itself is not at all exceptional.” (Hartmann, 1965, 154). Phenomena as 
such, therefore, ‘possess an apparent instability.’
Phenomena as such are unstable. They require consciousness to decide whether they are 
really existent or mere appearance. We cannot deny them, and yet neither can we just be 
satisfied with them. This is the case in life, even more so regarding scientific work, and 
definitely the case in relation to the fundamental questions of philosophy. The genuine 
self-transcendence of phenomena consists in this kind of demand, this imposition on con-
sciousness. This is a result of the instability of our consciousness of phenomena, is common 
4 Sparrow notes that “phenomenology is replete with accounts of the excesses of being (I am thinking 
here of Marion’s ‘saturated phenomenon’ and Levinas’s wholly Other, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s 
claim about the impossibility of bracketing the world), but we must ask if these excesses are genu-
ine evidence of a reality beyond consciousness or merely an excess of consciousness, an internal or 
intentional excess.” He concludes that they “are always internal to intentionality, not evidence of the 
autonomous reality of what appears in the phenomena” (Sparrow, 2014, 17). 
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to all phenomena as such, and is peculiar to them. […] And, it must be added, this forcing 
of the phenomenon does not compel us to accept one option or the other. No preliminary 
decision on behalf of being-in-itself is contained in it. This is at least the way it should be for 
a purely descriptive, clarified consciousness of phenomena. (Hartmann, 1965, 154)
The concept of ‘phenomenal transcendence’ deals with the question of how we 
know that some phenomenon is a phenomenon of something in itself. But Hartmann 
even recognizes that in his phenomenon of cognition (natural realism) this question 
cannot be settled simply by describing it. A decision still has to be made about it. ‘For 
us’ it seems to refer beyond itself to something real; is there something real in itself? 
Correlationism responds to this question by rendering it moot in advance through the 
suspension of metaphysical commitments. This move renders everything immanent to 
consciousness a priori, and regards the phenomenon Hartmann describes as an illusion5. 
This does not do away with the primary phenomenon of our experience of grasping 
something independent of our act of grasping. It recognizes a distinction between the 
‘for us’ and the ‘in itself ’ but claims that it has no ontological significance. But for Hart-
mann, the process of objectification, of problem consciousness, and of cognitive progress 
all indicate that something transcends consciousness, and it takes patient and disciplined 
investigation to determine just what the phenomena show. Receptive affective acts such 
as suffering from something that ‘befalls’ us reveal the ‘hardness of the real’ far more dis-
tinctly than cognition, and complement its testimony. From this reflective perspective, 
however, there is an expectation that phenomena are phenomena of ‘being-in-itself.’ The 
final piece of the puzzle is Hartmann’s claim that this is a misplaced expectation. 
5. HARTMANN’S AUFHEBUNG OF BEING-IN-ITSELF:  
TRANSCENDENCE, INDEPENDENCE, INDIFFERENCE
While the notion of the thing in itself is often associated with realism, just how 
it is associated with it remains a troublesome question. Hartmann calls it the “genu-
ine fundamental critical concept” (Hartmann, 2014, 54). Of the many ways in which 
Hartmann clarifies the concept, one includes discussion of the categories independ-
ence and dependence.
5 Meillassoux interprets the ‘for us’ and ‘in itself ’ distinction that is always implied by correlationism 
in an interesting way. He claims that correlationists cannot explain the ‘facticity’ of the ‘for us’/’in 
itself ’ distinction, i.e., the fact that there is a correlation at all. For him, this logically entails the ex-
istence of a realm of absolute contingency (so-called Hyper-Chaos) that plays the role of ‘in itself ’ 
in his work. (For a compact presentation of the argument in his 2006 Après la Finitude, see (Meil-
lassoux, 2014)). 
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In Laying the Foundations, he claims that while ontology is initially neutral 
regarding the issue of idealism and realism, “we are compelled to choose between 
these alternatives (idealism and realism) by the question concerning being-in-itself. 
[… I]t is not difficult to see that the choice must be for realism” (Hartmann, 1965, 
140). In his discussion of being-in-itself, Hartmann makes a crucial distinction be-
tween “gnoseological and ontological being-in-itself.” (‘Gnoseology’ is his preferred 
term for epistemology.) This is the fifth key point in assessing Hartmann’s position 
on phenomenology. His analysis of the phenomenon of cognition showed that we do 
indeed distinguish between the way that objects are given to us and the things them-
selves, but we immediately run into the correlationist aporia: if we only know about 
the thing through its givenness to us or objectification by us (dependence on us), then 
how could we ever know what it is in itself (its independence of us), beyond its mode 
of being-given? This distinction between epistemological and ontological rests in turn 
on Hartmann’s distinction between intentio recta and intentio obliqua, or between the 
‘natural attitude’ of everyday experience, sciences, and ontology, and the ‘reflective 
attitude’ of epistemology discussed above. Hartmann makes the case that the con-
cept ‘being-in-itself ’ is an artifact of the reflective epistemological stance that we have 
been conditioned to take at least since the Modern period. Being-in-itself is a ‘coun-
ter-concept’ to representation, appearance, phenomenon, or object, and is a product 
of the logic of the reflective stance. Ontologically speaking, however, the subject who 
knows, the object known, and their relation are all equally ‘real,’ and the process of 
cognition itself arises and passes away in time. (See the discussion of Hartmann’s 
interpretation of Kant’s ‘supreme principle’ in section 3 above.) Objects, phenome-
na, representations, etc., have their own kind of being too. “Therefore, that which 
was to be distinguished from ‘being-in-itself ’ [i.e., the ‘given’] is itself recognized to 
be being-in-itself” (Hartmann, 1965, 140). Hartmann describes this argument as a 
form of Aufhebung that results in a reversion from a reflective stance to the natural 
attitude.
Seen from the subject’s point of view (according to the ‘principle of consciousness’), all 
being-in-itself is taken up into being-for-me (something standing across from me); seen 
from the perspective of ‘being qua being,’ all being-in-itself, as well as being-for-me, is 
taken up into “what is as such.” The ontological concept of being-in-itself may thus be 
described as a reversion of the ontological perspective from intentio obliqua to intentio 
recta. (Hartmann, 1965, 141–42)
This does justice to the phenomenon of cognition, where “all cognition, even 
the most naïve, already possesses knowledge of its object’s being-in-itself, and already 
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understands it as a being existing independently of it” (Hartmann, 1965, 150)6. The 
apparent antinomy between the simultaneous dependence of the object on the subject 
and its independence from it is resolved this way: 
[I]n the cognitive relation, being-in-itself is essential for the object, but being-in-itself 
is indifferent to being an object; it admits of it without requiring it. From this relation, 
we see that the independence of the object of cognition from the subject—thus, its be-
ing-in-itself — is not at all impacted by the dependence of being an object for a subject. 
In this lies the solution to the apparent antinomy. Dependence and independence in the 
object of cognition are not contradictory, because the first pertains only to its being an 
object, while the latter pertains to the being-in-itself in it. Objectified being is an extrin-
sic determination of being-in-itself. (Hartmann, 1965, 151)
Since object and phenomenon are both reflective concepts, this means that 
“phenomenal being” is also an extrinsic determination. With this conceptual shift, 
Hartmann carefully articulates a concept of the real that is not defined in terms of its 
relation or lack of relation to a subject or knower. Ontologically speaking, to claim 
that “being is independent of thought” is a merely negative characterization in rela-
tion to us, and in fact inaccurate and “inessential,” since everything that exists stands 
in relationships of interdependence7. It is a ‘crutch’ for epistemology. The interdepen-
dence between epistemological subject and object is just one type of relation among 
others. What is central for ontology is not independence of thought from being or 
dependence of being on thought, but the ‘indifference’ of ‘what is.’
Ontically, everything that there is, in any sense whatever, is being-in-itself. […] We 
should not restrict ontological being-in-itself to the presence or absence of certain re-
lations; not even to the absence of a relation to the subject. […] [This conception] runs 
counter to the fundamental indifference of ‘being qua being.’ (Hartmann, 1965, 142)
6 Already in 1921, he helpfully explained that “[o]ntology takes a middle way between [natural re-
alism and idealism]. Its thesis is this: there is a real existent outside of consciousness, outside the 
logical sphere and the limits of ratio; cognition of objects has a relation to this existent and repro-
duces a portion of it, no matter how inconceivable the possibility of this reproduction seems; but 
the cognitive image is not congruent with the existent, it is neither complete (adequate) nor similar 
to the existent. Natural realism is justified in its bare thesis of reality, since the real lies in the ob-
ject-oriented direction of natural cognition; but it is unjustified in its thesis of [the immediate] ad-
equacy [of this knowledge]. The speculative standpoints are justified in their rejection of the latter, 
but unjustified in their extrusion of the real from the object-orientation. Ontology combines the 
justified aspects of both. It preserves the reality-thesis of the natural world image, but cancels the 
thesis of adequacy” (Hartmann, 1949, 188). 
7 “Everything existing stands in permanent interdependencies. The whole concept of the ‘independ-
ent’ is only a limiting case” (Hartmann, 1965, 141).
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The real is fundamentally indifferent to being known, and should not be defined 
in terms of its relation or lack thereof to a subject. Defining the real in terms of ‘in-
dependence from the subject’ thus appears to be a form of residual anthropocentrism 
derived from the epistemological standpoint. 
In conjunction with the reconception of the dualism between receptivity and 
spontaneity in his conception of cognition, this assessment of dependence and in-
dependence in ‘being-in-itself ’ gives us a way of situating Hartmann relative to the 
current tensions between phenomenological and realist writers. While correlation-
ism and constructivisms emphasize the independence and spontaneity of the subject, 
Hartmann emphasizes the receptivity and dependence of the human on a world not 
made for it. Entities are not dependent for their existence on subjects, even if ‘objects’ 
and ‘phenomena’ in some sense are. In the end, things are neither essentially inde-
pendent of nor dependent on us, they are simply ‘indifferent.’ The reflective distinc-
tion between the ‘for us’ and the ‘in itself ’ that seems so pressing for epistemology is 
an artifact of an artificial stance that ontology need not adopt. Hartmann’s Aufhebung 
of epistemological being-in-itself, his redefinition of the real beyond dependence and 
independence, and his understanding of transcendent acts as originally in contact 
with something other than thought, provide helpful resources as we (re)enter this 
turn of the century trend toward realist ontology. 
6. CONCLUSION
I hope this paper has shed some light on the long-standing question whether 
Hartmann should count as a phenomenologist, and why this matters in the context 
of new realisms. To answer it, we had to consider five important points. First, Hart-
mann himself makes a distinction between the phenomenological school of thought 
and phenomenological method. He defuses the tension between the (metaphysical) 
sciences and (phenomenological) humanism in his assessment of the phenomenolog-
ical movement, which clearly places him outside of the school. He employs a method 
that aims to provide a description of phenomena following on a suspension of meta-
physical commitments that is directed at their essential structures, with some impor-
tant qualifications. The second point is that he rejects the phenomenological reduc-
tion because it identifies the natural (realist) attitude with a metaphysical standpoint, 
and in turn subscribes to the possibility of achieving an artificial ‘naïve consciousness’ 
free of metaphysical assumptions. Both are mistaken. Thirdly, his assessment of phe-
nomenology is conditioned by his conception of cognition as a transcendent act, along 
with the distinction between intentio recta and obliqua. He finds that phenomenolo-
HORIZON 8 (1) 2019 51
gy fails to adequately account for the whole phenomenon of cognition, especially its 
characteristic grasp of something independent of the act. Fourthly, Hartmann grants 
that the givenness of phenomena is our primary mode of experience, but holds that 
phenomena are characteristically ‘unstable,’ implicitly referring to something beyond 
themselves, forcing us to decide whether what they show is genuine or not (phenom-
enal transcendence). There is thus no infallible intuition of phenomena, even of ideal 
structures. Finally, from an epistemological perspective, the concept ‘being-in-itself ’ 
is a kind of ‘crutch’ and counterpart to the concept of the phenomenon, which for the 
purposes of ontology we do not need. Whether ‘that which is’ is given to us as phe-
nomenon or objectified by us as object or not is entirely indifferent to what is. ‘What 
is’ cannot be ontologically defined in terms of its relativity to a subject. Unfortunately, 
the correlationist standpoint of phenomenology cannot avoid it. 
I have offered a few insights that might lead us to a more definitive answer to 
the question about Hartmann’s relation to phenomenology. It remains to fill in this 
picture more fully. A more serious question follows: is Hartmann right about phe-
nomenology? If so, what can we learn from him about overcoming anti-realism? 
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